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Abstract 
There has been much work to improve IT systems for managing and maintaining health records. 
The U.S government is trying to integrate different types of health care data for providers and 
patients. Health care fraud detection research has focused on claims by providers, physicians, 
hospitals, and other medical service providers to detect fraudulent billing, abuse, and waste. 
Data-mining techniques have been used to detect patterns in health care fraud and reduce the 
amount of waste and abuse in the health care system. However, less attention has been paid to 
implementing a system to detect fraudulent applications, specifically for Medicaid. In this study, 
a data-driven system using layered architecture to filter fraudulent applications for Medicaid was 
proposed. The Medicaid Eligibility Application System utilizes a set of public and private 
databases that contain individual asset records. These asset records are used to determine the 
Medicaid eligibility of applicants using a scoring model integrated with a threshold algorithm. 
The findings indicated that by using the proposed data-driven approach, the state Medicaid 
agency could filter fraudulent Medicaid applications and save over $4 million in Medicaid 
expenditures.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 The U.S. health care system has two federal health programs: Medicare and Medicaid. 
Medicare is a federal program that provides health insurance coverage for individuals aged 65 or 
older or individuals under age 65 with certain disabilities or conditions such as end-stage renal 
disease. Medicare has four parts:  
A. Hospital insurance—provides payments to cover inpatient care in hospitals, 
including critical hospital services, skilled nursing facilities, and some home 
health care.  
B. Medical insurance—provides payments to cover hospital outpatients, including 
doctors’ services, preventive services, physical and occupational therapists, some 
home health care, and medical equipment.  
C. Health plan coverage—provides payment to health plans to cover services not 
covered by Medicare Parts A and B. This is accomplished through providing 
health coverage premium plans for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage.   
D. Prescription drug coverage—insurance provided by private companies to provide 
Medicare prescription drug coverage to everyone with Medicare. Medicare 
beneficiaries may purchase prescription drug coverage for outpatient 
prescriptions.  
Medicare is funded by general government revenues and taxpayer funds from such 
sources as employee payroll taxes, employers, self-employed individuals, and beneficiary plans. 
Medicaid, on the other hand, is a need-based program funded jointly by federal and state 
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governments and administered separately by each state government. Medicaid provides health 
coverage for short- and long-term services for low-income people. Each state defines Medicaid 
eligibility and administers payments for health care services. Eligible groups include children, 
families, seniors, and people with developmental and/or physical disabilities. The federal 
government pays each state according to a formula established by law, which can amount to up 
to three-fourths of the cost the state pays to provide coverage for Medicaid beneficiaries (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2014; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011).  
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011) considers Medicare and Medicaid to 
be high-risk programs due to their size and complexity, as well as their vulnerability to improper 
payment (overpayment or underpayment of funds to health care entities) and mismanagement of 
records. In fiscal year 2010, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reported 
that Medicare and Medicaid had about $70 billion in improper payments (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2011). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services within HHS is 
leading the effort to reduce the number of improper payments. The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services is responsible for administering both Medicare and Medicaid and utilizing a 
variety of technology-based solutions to detect improper payments in an effort to prevent such 
payments before they are made.  
Among the solutions are the Integrated Data Repository (IDR) and Program Integrity 
(One PI) system. The former is intended to provide Medicare and Medicaid with a single source 
of data related to their claims whereas the latter is a web-based portal and a collection of 
analytical software tools used for analysis of data extracted from IDR. Although the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services has made many improvements to IDR and One PI in order to 
achieve its goals, it is not yet capable of identifying and measuring whether these solutions have 
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provided any financial benefits due to limited use of the system, insufficient data for 
measurement, and the scattering of data across different state Medicaid programs (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2011).     
Health care fraud has attracted the interest of researchers during the 10 years. The need to 
address the issue of fraudulent billing transactions by health care providers has led to the 
exploitation of the modern U.S health care system. This has created a need for data-mining tools 
and health care system improvements. In 2009, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
estimated health care fraud to be between 3% and 10% of total health care expenditures ($2.6 
trillion). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.) estimates that health care fraud costs 
American tax payers $80 billion a year. The National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (n.d.-
b) estimates that the financial losses due to health care fraud each year are in the tens of billions 
of dollars. The incidence of health care fraud continues to rise due to the complexity of the U.S. 
health care system and the amount of data involved. Failure to implement an effective 
environment will continue to impact health care costs. Health care fraud is a crime that consists 
of misrepresentation of facts or providing false information to deceive the health care system for 
illegal gain (Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, n.d.; National Health Care Anti-Fraud 
Association, n.d.-a). This is particularly important in the case of Medicaid because it is operated 
by state governments individually, not by the federal government as in the case of Medicare.  
The federal eligibility requirement for Medicaid states that applicants must be U.S. 
citizens with low income (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, n.d.). Every state 
maintains its own Medicaid eligibility guidelines for individuals and families with low income 
and limited resources. Some states provide eligibility for individuals and families below the 
poverty line and dictate limited asset resources of a maximum of $2,000. Other states assess 
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limited asset resources in specific (North Carolina Division of Medical Assistance, n.d.). For 
example, vehicles are considered a type of asset. A state might allow owning one vehicle 
regardless of value and evaluate supplementary vehicles to determine eligibility whereas other 
states might consider the value of one vehicle. Many states do not check out-of-state databases to 
determine comprehensive asset ownership in their verification process. 
Health care fraud detection research focuses on fraud claims by providers, physicians, 
hospital services, and so on to detect fraudulent billing, abuse, and waste. Data-mining 
techniques to detect health care fraud have helped detect fraud patterns by providers and reduce 
the amount of waste and abuse in the health care system. Although researchers (e.g., He, Wang, 
Graco, & Hawkins, 1997; National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, 2002; Pflaum & Rivers, 
1990) have suggested that most health care fraud is caused by providers, applicants and health 
care beneficiaries may also account for a large portion of health care fraud. However, less 
attention has been paid to Medicare and Medicaid fraud by applicants in the health care system. 
Thus, this research was focused on detecting fraud by applicants in the Medicaid portion of the 
health care system.     
1.2 Problem Statement   
The fundamental challenge facing health care today is that it is imperative to detect health 
care fraud before it occurs while simultaneously providing health care services for those in need. 
Increasingly, U.S. states are recognizing the need for a robust verification system for Medicaid 
applicants. Effective, real-time communication between state government resources, federal 
government resources, and third-party private sources is vital to eliminating health care fraud. 
For example, some health care services rely on paper records to verify applicants’ information. 
However, this process of verification is unreliable, ineffective, and vulnerable to forgery, loss of 
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documents, and failure to track changes in applicants’ information. Medicaid records have 
similar vulnerabilities as they rely on paper, which results in unorganized data that cannot be 
evaluated or analyzed. Medicaid requires a platform that supports the integration, development, 
and automation of fraud detection of Medicaid applications. The proposed data-driven system 
combines comprehensive, standards-based Medicaid eligibility guidelines (North Carolina 
Department of Health Human Services, n.d.-a) with a robust set of fraud detection workflow 
processes to filter fraudulent Medicaid applications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Related Work 
2.1 Data Mining 
Generally, data mining is the process of analyzing a large amount of generated data and 
summarizing it into useful information that can be used to increase revenue, reduce costs, or 
both. Technically, data mining is the process of finding correlations, trends, and patterns among 
several entities in large databases (Milley, 2000). Predictive analysis models derived from data-
mining techniques and methods have helped the financial, telecommunications, and health care 
industries detect fraud. Data-mining models to identify fraud in other domains have also been 
proposed (Fawcett & Provost, 1997; Ghosh & Reilly, 1994; Grosser, Britos, & García-Martínez, 
2005). 
Bakar, Mohemad, Ahmad, and Deris (2006) presented the results of an experimental 
study of outlier detection techniques and indicated that the control chart technique is better than 
the linear regression technique for outlier data detection. They also described the use of 
Megaputer Intelligence’s PolyAnalyst software for clustering, regression models, and decision 
trees to fight against fraud schemes. Although these tools do not eliminate fraud before it enters 
the system, they can help process large volumes of data to detect unusual behaviors. Koh and 
Tan (2011) and J. Yang (2006) highlighted the limitations of data mining and discussed future 
directions for research.  
Phua, Lee, Smith, and Gayler (2010) conducted a survey to examine fraud detection from 
a practical, data-oriented, performance-driven perspective rather than the typical application-
oriented or technique-oriented view. However, they did not propose a model for eligibility fraud 
analysis or provide live data set implementation for fraud detection. The Survey was conducted 
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as a literature review of many fraud detection methods. Viaene, Derrig, and Dedene (2004) 
combined the advantages of boosting and the flexibility of the probabilistic weight of evidence 
scoring to explain and effectively diagnose automobile insurance claim fraud. However, the 
framework applied for diagnosis of automobile insurance claim fraud may not be sufficient for 
detecting fraudulent activities among applicants for Medicaid benefits.  
Shan, Jeacocke, Murray, and Sutinen (2008) applied association rule mining to the 
examination of billing patterns to detect suspicious claims and potentially fraudulent 
applications. They identified both positive and negative association rules from specialist billing 
records. All of the rules were classified as either compliant or noncompliant. Thiruvadi and Patel 
(2011) discussed effective uses of different data-mining techniques to detect and prevent four 
different types of fraud: management, customer, network, and computer. Whereas Shan et al. 
(2008) and Thiruvadi and Patel (2011) concentrated on fraud that already existed in the health 
care system, this study was focused on preventing fraud from entering the health care system. If 
fraudulent schemes are targeted before they happen, the amount of federal funds disbursed to 
fraudsters will be reduced, and the need for the application of fraud detection methods to large 
data sets will be lessened. 
The concept of clinical pathways was initiated in the 1990s for diagnosis and therapeutic 
intervention by physicians and nurses (Healy et al., 1998; Ireson, 1997). The application of 
clinical pathways is an efficient approach to analyzing and controlling clinical care in a 
framework of data mining for fraud detection. W. Yang and Hwang (2006) proposed a 
framework that was evaluated using a real-world data set to verify the data analysis process on 
health care fraud and abuse. The experiments showed that the proposed detection model could 
efficiently identify fraudulent and abusive activities by providers that manual detection models 
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could not detect through the clinical pathway concept. The detection model serves best as an 
example for which Bruggemann, Wijma, and Swahnberg (2012) could have used in health care 
abuse analysis. 
Copeland (2011) applied a fraud detection approach using an unsupervised data-mining 
technique to flag companies with irregular medical claims. By creating and using 12 statistical 
variables in the data set, Copeland identified six companies that required further investigation for 
fraudulent activities. The flagged companies all had higher scores than the other companies. The 
applied fraud detection approach successfully detected 5.9% of flagged companies’ net payment 
in suspicious incontinence supplies claims for Medicaid patients. This unsupervised data-mining 
approach has been used in the past and will continue to be used for Medical fraud detection 
because it can efficiently capture patterns hidden in data claims. However, the technique may 
become less efficient or less reliable as data set volume increases. 
Expensive health care costs affect both government health care systems and private 
health insurers. Allowing health care providers to defraud the federal and private health system 
only makes it worse. W. Yang and Hwang (2006) focused on a data-mining framework utilizing 
clinical pathways to facilitate automatic and systematic construction of an adaptable and 
extensible detection model based on the work of Hwang, Wei, and Yang (2004) and Wei, 
Hwang, and Yang (2000). Their approach was evaluated using a non-U.S. health care database 
data set. However, the framework is still relevant because it was tested on a real-world data set. 
It successfully detected cases of fraud and abuse in Taiwan’s National Health Insurance system, 
though the results were compared to a manually constructed detection model and not an 
automated detection algorithm model. The detection model outcome demonstrated that the 
approach should be expanded to handle more noisy data and should be scalable with flexibility to 
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accommodate health care policy changes. Although the data-mining framework did not uncover 
all health care fraud situations, it uncovered some fraudulent activity, which was the purpose of 
creating the model (Chan & Lan, 2001).  
Although the health care environment yields a high volume of rich information, it lacks 
ways of showing hidden relationship trends in its data. Describes each classification data mining 
techniques; Rules set classifier, IF conditions Then conclusion, Decision tree algorithms, Neural 
Network Architecture, nuero-fuzzy, and Bayesian Network Structure Discoveries to their 
application in health care. “If_then_rule” illustrated for the diagnosis of level of alcohol in blood, 
can be applied in the health care system as a prediction rule to represent a high level abstraction 
in knowledge discovery according to (Srinivas, Rani, & Govrdhan, 2010). Srinivas et al. (2010) 
illustrated how each data-mining technique applies to the health care system and presented a 
method of predicting heart attacks using data mining. By extracting patterns from data 
warehouses for heart disease to calculate significant weightage patterns, the researchers 
determined a threshold for predicting heart attacks. 
Data-mining challenges are one of the key issues facing health care fraud detection (El-
Sappagh, El-Masri, Riad, & Elmogy, 2013). Such challenges include the following (Canlas, 
2009; Q. Yang & Wu, 2006): 
• Algorithms—very high algorithmic accuracy is needed because health care deals 
with life-or-death issues. Algorithm accuracy depends on data consistency and 
can be affected by noisy or missing data.  
• Status—data mining must be active with two types of triggers: one to trigger 
data-mining techniques and one to enforce discovery knowledge within 
information systems.  
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• Comparison—data mining must apply techniques then compare the results for 
selection of the most interesting.  
• Results—data-mining system results must be appended to the existing 
knowledge base.  
• Longitudinal, temporal, and spatial support—data-mining techniques must be 
advanced in order to address electronic health care records (Hripcsak, Knirsch, 
Zhou, Wilcox, & Melton, 2011).  
• Database—data mining must extend beyond a relational database. Although 
relational databases are the most common type, they must be extended to object-
oriented databases and multimedia databases for use with KDD (knowledge 
extraction, data/pattern analysis, data archeology, data dredging, information 
harvesting, and business intelligence) (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, & Smyth, 
1996).  
• Environment—data-mining distributed environments present a challenge in 
mining across multidatabase and multirelational data-mining sources.  
• Integration—data mining faces the challenge of system integration of 
visualization tools and database management systems. 
2.2 Neural Network 
A neural network is a computer program that operates in a manner that is analogous to 
the natural neural network in the brain. The primary function of neural networks is to emulate the 
brain’s pattern-recognition skills. Li, Huang, Jin, and Shi (2008) provided an overview of all 
types of fraud in the health care industry and the health care fraud-detection categories applied 
for the use of statistical methods. Statistical methods are divided into two categories: supervised 
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and unsupervised. The types of methods used in health care include neural networks (He et al., 
1997; Nolting, 2006; Ortega, Figueroa, & Ruz, 2006), decision trees, associate rules, Bayesian 
networks, and genetic algorithms (Bentley, 2000). Li et al. (2008) describes the data-processing 
steps: goal setting, data cleaning, handling missing values, data transformation, feature selection, 
and data auditing, for anlayzing health care data. Algorithms are used in the health care decision 
tree. W.-S. Yang & Hwang (2006) used the C4.5 algorithm for co-training decision tree method 
to identify service provider’s fraud of the Bureau of National Health Insurance (NHI) in Taiwan.  
Travaille, Müller, Thornton, and Hillegersberg (2011) showed that supervised techniques 
are necessary for an effective fraud detection system. Furthermore, the researchers proved that 
the techniques in various domains were effective for fraud detection. As a result, no one 
technique—supervised or unsupervised—can be used to discover all instances of fraud. A fraud 
detection system consists of multiple techniques to effectively combat fraud and abuse. Becker, 
Kessler, and McClellan (2005) used a patient sample to rate neural network prediction accuracy 
relative to binary regression. This technique offers great promise for information prediction. 
2.3 Big Data 
The term big data is used to describe the exponential growth, availability, and use of 
information, both structured and unstructured. Much has been written on the big data trend and 
how it can serve as the basis for innovation, differentiation, and growth. Peng et al. (2006) found 
two types of clustering methods: SAS EM and CLUTO. The researchers used a large health 
insurance data set to compare the performance of the two methods. Experimental results 
indicated that CLUTO was faster than SAS EM, though SAS EM provided more useful clusters 
than CLUTO. The researchers recommended using classification algorithm to predict reliable 
insurance claims. They also presented the results of an experimental study of outlier detection 
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techniques and compared two such techniques using a statistical approach with linear regression 
and control charts. The results indicated that the control chart technique was better than the linear 
regression technique for outlier data detection. Finally, Peng et al. (2006) analyzed Manhattan 
distance technique based on distance approach (Bruggemann et al., 2012). Health care industry 
experts have estimated that if the U.S. health care system uses big data creatively and effectively 
to drive efficiency and quality, it can generate an annual health care savings of more than $300 
billion (Institute for HealthCare Consumerism, n.d.).   
One of the essential elements of detecting health care fraud is utilizing an efficient and 
accurate health care data management system. Any minor problem in data management can 
make even the most ideal fraud detection models useless. A close look at U.S. health care 
information systems illustrates four data management problems in the health care system and 
offers a few insights into future health care system development (Dolins & Kero, 2006; 
Khosrow-Pour, 2006). Health care data management problems such as data integration issues 
between heterogeneous systems can affect the outcome of any detection model. For example, if a 
proposed model relies on inconsistent data integration from federal, state, and private sectors, 
then it is impossible to associate an applicant between these heterogeneous systems to detect any 
fraud by the applicant in a state’s Medicaid health care database. A recommended solution is the 
extract, transform, load (ETL) process in data warehousing to accommodate for heterogeneous 
systems. However, electronic medical records (EMRs) and national data repositories must 
accompany ETL in order to solve health care data management problem. Utilizing EMR and 
national data repositories ensures health care fraud detection frameworks receive valuable data 
input for further analysis and knowledge discovery (Dolins & Kero, 2006; Khosrow-Pour, 2006). 
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2.4 Data Analysis  
Abuse of the health care system is one type of fraud that requires a widespread data 
analysis. Walker and Avant (2005) developed a concept analysis on health care abuse by 
utilizing a database index of nursing, Medline, Allied Health literature, and Google Scholar to 
locate articles on abuse in health care. The result of the concept analysis was that patients’ 
experience with the health care system led to abuse in health care. Patients who felt that their 
value as a human being had suffered were often unintentionally abusing health care. Thus, health 
care abuse by patients may be seen as linked to satisfaction with health care coverage and not 
fraud. The concept of abuse in health care should be taken into consideration by providers and 
facilities. Bruggemann et al. (2012) proposed a method or technique for investigating the 
operation of abuse in health care by patients by gathering patient analysis of health care abuse.  
2.5 Scoring Model 
A scoring model approach is another key technique in detecting medical fraud. 
Identifying anomalies can provide an effective way of locating hidden fraudulent transactions in 
health care data. Shin, Park, Lee, and Jhee (2012) proposed a scoring model based on profile 
information retrieved from electronic health insurance claims to detect abusive billing patterns. 
The model consisted of two functions: (a) quantifying the degree of abuse and (b) segmentation 
of providers with similar patterns. The proposed research model was applied to a Korean internal 
medicine clinic and a national health insurance corporation for outpatient claims. The authors 
compared the composite degree of anomaly score formulated for intervention and 
nonintervention groups and examined confusion matrices by intervention history and group to 
assess the validity of the model. The results showed 38 abusiveness indicators for separate 
clinics, which were further segmented into homogenous clusters based on their pattern using a 
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decision tree approach. As a result, the validation of the proposed model was in line with manual 
detection techniques to identify potential abusers. 
The scoring model approach is not limited to just detecting hidden patterns in health care. 
It has the potential to detect fraud by applicants in environments with many variables and 
parameters. Agrawal, El-Bathy, and Seay (2012) initiated an integrated data broker services 
architecture approach to detecting Medicaid fraud at the time of the application approval process. 
This architecture took advantage of several public databases available through different 
government and public organizations through a scoring model mechanism and utilized a 
customizable weighting scheme to determine eligibility for Medicaid services. Research in other 
fields such as accounting looked at scoring model techniques to predict fraudulent behavior.  
Researchers (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Dunn, 2004) have 
investigated the relationship between corporate government features and financial statement 
fraud. Financially related warning variable have been investigated by Beneish (1997), Dechow et 
al. (1996), and Summers and Sweeney (1998). Dechow, Ge, Larson, Sloan, and Investors (2007) 
developed a model to estimate misstatement probability as a function of accruals quality, market 
related fraud, and performance measures. The researchers used data issued by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission on accounting and auditing enforcement releases to detect 
accounting fraud through variables identification that correlate with accounting results fraud 
score output as a screening device to signal further investigation. Dionne, Giuliano, and Picard 
(2009) developed a scoring model approach to detecting fraud that included insurance fraud 
detection by using explicitly described fraudulent behavior without limiting the scoring model 
approach to purely a statistical approach that identified fraud signals and produced fraud 
probability estimates.  
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2.6 Layered Architecture 
Electronic management of Medicaid applications plays an important role in state 
departments of health and human services, as it does in the overall U.S. health care system. 
Health care informatics is being developed to better manage and increase the study of health 
care. Insight into developing and deploying EMRs and national data repositories to manage 
health care information systems is offered in Dolins and Kero (2006) and Khosrow-Pour (2006). 
One insight is the ETL data-warehousing solution to accommodate for heterogeneous systems. 
Utilizing private asset data resources, such as EMRs and national repositories, is ideal for 
providing health care fraud detection frameworks with accurate data for analysis and discovery.  
Enterprise architecture has also been reviewed as a way to resolve health care data 
management problems. DePalo and Song (2012) proposed the interoperability of enterprise 
architecture for health care organizations. By embracing external entities in enterprise 
architecture for health care interoperability, health care organization can increase patient 
satisfaction, accumulate meaningful data, and better support business processes. Attention to 
external entities and data exchange can be used to assess truthful fraud detection tools for 
fighting against health care fraud.  
A hospital case for modeling health care through enterprise architecture provides insight 
into processing health care–IT integration (Ahsan, Shah, & Kingston, 2010). It incorporates a 
developed enterprise architecture framework called ArchiMate into a health care reference model 
to provide an IT service foundation for adapting system design and implementation for health 
care. (Ahsan et al., 2010)  also presented an analysis and overview of health care organization 
processes in enterprise architecture in their case study. Interrelated components within each layer 
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play an important role in enterprise architecture since applicants and health care patient concepts 
may cover many business aspects and application layer components.  
Many view web services in enterprise architecture as providing efficiency and 
optimization in health care. Some use web services for health care fraud detection. The 
iWebCare platform project is an integrated web service platform for fraud detection for 
government health care services. The platform design and development provide flexible, online 
fraud detection modules. The detection of suspicious records across health care system data sets 
in Europe demonstrates the equality and consistency of the system for fraud detection. The 
reporting module of the iWebCare platform is responsible for generating and presenting post 
validation reports in a user-friendly format. Fraud detection is associated with the user interface 
and informs the user according to behavioral rules once the module discovers suspicious or 
erroneous records (Tagaris et al., 2009). Although health care literature does not appear to 
include any published papers demonstrating Medicaid interoperability in layered architecture or 
a web platform for filtering Medicaid fraud and erroneous Medicaid applications, these concepts 
are presented here. 
2.7 Fraud Detection  
Bolton and Hand (2002) reported that types of fraud increase dramatically with the 
expansion of modern technology. Pattern-detection behaviors are quickly becoming obsolete due 
to rapid changes in behavior. An ideal proposed model for eliminating fraud in Medicaid must be 
flexible, scalable, and easy to use in order to eliminate Medicaid fraud at an early stage of 
Medicaid application, during eligibility determination. The Medicaid Eligibility Application 
system presents other opportunities for fighting the escalation of Medicaid fraud. For example, 
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the key issue with building fraud detection tools is adaptation to legitimate and fraudulent 
behavior changes.  
Signature-based predictive tracking can be used for fraud detection in medical 
transactions. The broad signature-based predictive tracking concept can predict transaction 
behavior, which is potentially valuable for many applications (Cahill, Lambert, Pinheiro, & Sun, 
2002; Cortes & Pregibon, 2001). For example, signature-based tracking can be utilized in 
Medicaid fraud detection to detect Medicaid applicant behaviors. It is particularly relevant 
because medical information is stored in homologous systems through penetration of Medicaid 
eligibility across states. 
 Li et al. (2008) and Phua et al. (2010) conducted studies of fraud-detection techniques 
from a practical, data-oriented approach to detect fraud in health care, electronic fraud, and fraud 
in other industry areas. Data-mining techniques of statistical methods applied to health care for 
fraud detection include decision trees, neural networks, association rules, Bayesian networks, 
and genetic algorithms. These techniques have recovered millions of dollars of U.S. health care 
funding and captured many fraudulent providers, facilities, and organized entities. Furthermore, 
fraud scams regenerating from “hospital stay conflict, hospital stay with no associated physician 
inpatient visit, excessive lab/radiology services per client per day, X-ray duplicate billing, 
fragmented lab and X-ray procedures, lab/X-ray interpretation with no associated technical 
portion, and ambulance trips with no associated medical service” can now be detected (Li et al., 
2008; Sokol, Garcia, West, Rodriguez, & Johnson, 2001).  
Data-mining fraud-detection techniques must be used to analyze data from the health care 
system, a complex structure to detect unknown patterns in the data. SAS (King & Malida, n.d.), 
Exodus Payment System (Exodus Payment Systems, n.d.), and Dun and Bradstreet (Mears & 
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Dun & Bradstreet, 2012) provide alternative methods for detecting Medicaid fraud, such as the 
eligibility fraud method, the broad data source pool approach, or the use of biometric engine 
technology to tackle a small area of the big problem. Utilizing different tools from various 
companies to fight against each type of fraud creates inconsistency, inefficiency, and 
unreliability in terms of fraud detection in the health care database system. However, utilizing 
one tool to detect all fraud types creates an ideal solution to the health fraud problem.  
Health care industry could benefit from a software solution that integrates fraud detection 
techniques for outlier detection with data mining, clustering, and predictive models to solve the 
Medicaid fraud problem in all four categories: processing, organization, technology, and 
analytics.  
Although there are many software packages, tools, and methods for detecting fraud and 
recovering millions of health care federal dollars, they come at a cost. These costs continue to 
increase as fraud-detection data-mining software and analytics tools require more integration in 
order to detect new fraud. For example, unintegrated software is ultimately more expensive than 
a fully integrated software solution.  
Two case studies provide an example of utilizing a fully integrated software solution to 
detect fraud: the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance case study on income tax 
refund fraud, abuse, and debt collection and the North Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services case study on Medicaid fraud detection. The first study consisted of 5,000 
employees, about $60 billion in annual income collected, and taxpayers from a wide range of 
demographics and cultural backgrounds. The New York State Department of Taxation and 
Finance applied IBM’s Integrated Business Solution and predictive models to identify the next-
best audit selection. As a result, the department’s revenue increased by $889 million in the first 
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five years. The system also “increased screener and auditor productivity,” “enhanced taxpayer 
correspondence,” and “improved audit program management.” The second case study consisted 
of 100 Program Integrity Unit employees, about $14 billion in annual paid claims, and $25 
million in recoupment letters issued each year. The North Carolina Department of Health and 
Human Services incorporated IBM’s health analytics solution to detect suspicious patterns in 
claims and identify suspicious providers in real time as they filed claims. As a result, the North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services recovered between $60 million and $100 
million over a 12-month period, identified $140 million in claim data, recovered $86 million of 
the $555 million in personal care services, and recovered $55 million of the $235 million in 
durable medical equipment.  
IBM’s sophisticated and real-time analytics software provides proper analytical 
oversight. Using complex mathematics and model statistics to examine existing data sources in a 
faster, smarter, and better way allows states to achieve a positive return on investment, greater 
efficiency, and greater fraud detection reliability (IBM Corporation, n.d.; North Carolina 
Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.-b). 
Many fraudulent techniques emerge every year to illegally gain health care funds and 
benefits. Furthermore, as data volume increases and Medicare and Medicaid expand, it becomes 
necessary to investigate this problem from every aspect and dimension. IBM’s Smarter Signature 
Solution provides the following solutions to the health care problem;  
1. detecting suspicious transactions before payment is arranged 
2. minimizing loss from fraud over payment 
3. analyzing a range of suspect behavior from claims and providers simultaneously 
4. analyzing and flagging past suspicious patterns 
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5. analyzing new fraudulent schemes from similar detect fraud activities  
6. detecting fraud in real time to stop illegal use of health care funds 
These are some of the many services IBM provides. There are many more in IBM’s 
Integrated Software Solution to combat against state health care fraud (Yueh & Barry, 2010).
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
3.1 Current Approach Used By State Health Care Departments 
Every state maintains its own Medicaid eligibility guidelines for individuals and families 
with low income and limited resources. Table 1 provides a sample of state Medicaid eligibility 
requirements. The requirements by states shown in Table 1 are used to verify applicants’ 
information against federal and in-state database resources. States do not check out-of-state 
databases or third-party database resources for broader information accuracy. The process starts 
with checking major federal government databases such as the Beneficiary and Earnings Data 
Exchange database (Bendex) or the social security database for determining citizenship, 
matching social security numbers, and checking in-state databases such as the Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) database to check for any vehicles that the applicants own. Also, states 
can use bank account documents to determine applicants’ asset resources and other assets that 
applicants declare in their application.  
Table 1  
State-by-State Eligibility Requirements 
Sample State-by-State (Eligibility Requirements for Individuals) 
State Poverty level Income Resources Asset specified 
NC 200% $22,980 $3,000 cash One vehicle regardless of value 
GA 133% $15,282 $2,000 cash Vehicle value up to $4500 
TN 185% $20,000 $2,000 resources Vehicle value 
NJ 200% $22,980 $2,000 resources Vehicle value 
NY 200% $22,980 $2,000 resources Vehicle value 
 
3.2 Problems With The Current Approach 
Escalation of fraud usually occurs when a wide range of ineffective cooperated health 
care environments are open for fraud. Examples of Medicaid eligibility fraud include resource 
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misrepresentation, eligible members sharing resources and benefits with ineligible members, 
misrepresentation of medical conditions, failure to report third-party resources, and eligibility 
determination issues. Fraud in general usually escalates when environments have one or more 
broken areas of detection. Health care fraud in the United States occurs due to health care 
complexity system and because the health care system relies on other factors such as federal and 
state systems. Problems in Medicaid fraud should be addressed while factoring in other 
collaboration systems such as those mentioned in chapter 2.  
An opportunity for fraud exists when state agencies do not check out-of-states databases 
to determine the asset resources of an individual and compare this to what the applicant has filed 
in the application process. For example, an individual or family may relocate from one state to 
another and apply for Medicaid benefits in the new state while still owning assets such as 
vehicles, boats, bikes, and real estate property in the old state. When states only check 
applicants’ resources against in-state databases, applicants who are ineligible because of 
undeclared out-of- state assets may become eligible for Medicaid benefits.  
Health care departments may use assets, bank account statements, and income documents 
from employers provided by the applicant to initiate the eligibility process. When the chain of 
documents is broken, applicants may find ways to submit fraudulent documents. For example, an 
applicant might alter income documents from an employer or bank account statements before 
submitting them. 
Cooperation at the system level presents another key problem in this process. Lack of 
unification of data sources between states, local state governments, and the federal government 
creates opportunities for fraud. For example, state Medicaid services departments can gain some 
direct access to federal database resources for their infrastructure operations. However, it appears 
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that states cannot gain direct access to other states’ resources such as Medicaid services 
department files, DMV databases, and so on. Slow processes due to manual detection and 
reverification present other opportunities for fraud. Such manual operations lack accurate results, 
allow for inaccurate data and information storage, and permit more fraudulent schemes. If the 
verification of thousands of applicants depends on a human representative, there is an 
opportunity for white-collar fraud or human error. By contrast, an automated process can yield 
accurate results and accumulate detailed reports.  
Privacy laws may present an opportunity for fraud by applicants and users that health 
care department representatives must be aware of. Although it is not possible to conceal 
information retrieval and operational processes from the public, utilizing private and public 
databases reduces the opportunity for fraud. 
3.3 Medicaid Eligibility Application System Prototype 
The problems mentioned in the previous section must be addressed by researchers. 
Although many researchers have used a variety of data-mining techniques to detect fraud, they 
have focused on providers, false services, and improper billing. The prototype system proposed 
in this study represents the integration of an eligibility determination system with in-state and 
out-of-state public asset databases. It involves checking Bendex records for identifying 
citizenship status, legal residence status, social security records, banks records through tax 
returns, and public and DMV databases for checking assets. Public records from Data Broker 
databases (Agrawal et al., 2012) are also used to identify and retrieve assets that an applicant 
may or may not have. The system is focused on applicants at the beginning stages of Medicaid 
eligibility application. The following subsections represent the proposed architecture of the 
system including algorithms and the eligibility process for detecting and eliminating fraud. 
26 
 
 
3.3.1 Model overview 
 
Figure 1 An Integrated Medicaid Fraud-Detection Model 
Figure 1 shows the proposed Medicaid eligibility system model for identifying public 
assets with in-state and out-of-state records. According to the model, an applicant’s application 
information is matched against public records. Each type of category consists of a predetermined 
weight. Depending on the results returned from these public records and using these weights, a 
final eligibility score is calculated based on a threshold value. As a result, an applicant’s 
application may be rejected or accepted or additional information may be sought. 
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3.3.2 Eligibility flow  
 
Figure 2 Medicaid Eligibility Flow Model 
The eligibility process is initiated when an applicant files an application for Medicaid 
benefits, providing the system with information such as legal name, social security number, 
address, marital status, and so on. Figure 2 illustrates the entire process flow from the start of the 
28 
 
 
application to the decision output. The eligibility determination system sends the data to a 
process called social security check to compare the applicant’s social security number to the 
Bendex database for match based on the applicant’s name and Citizenship verification through 
Social Security Administration (SSA) records (Social Security Administration, n.d.).  
When these two major factors (social security number and immigration status) are 
verified, the requirement guidelines review process begins. This process comprises a variety of 
subprocesses to check for eligibility. Each subprocess identifies all assets associated with the 
applicant from DMV records, income records, and other public asset database resources. The 
goal is to create an algorithm based on the weights and scores of all assets identified from public 
records while allowing for scalability based on state requirements. Cost of living, region, and 
property values differ between states; therefore a unified algorithm that supports all state 
parameters would be difficult to create, inefficient, and unscalable. Allowing states to adjust the 
algorithm to their parameters is ideal for detecting Medicaid fraud.  
3.3.3 Eligibility determination and calculation. There are many assets that an 
individual or family may own. Assets are grouped into five categories as follows: (a) equity (e.g., 
commercial real estate, private real estate), (b) fixed assets (e.g., vehicles, boats, planes, bikes), 
(c) collectables (e.g., art, coins, stamps, wine), (d) cash sources (cash on hand, cash at the bank 
in checking or savings), and (e) others (e.g., bonds, stocks, fixed interests). These categories 
provide the means to retrieve the appropriate score. The categories can include exempt or 
nonexempt assets. For example, states may exempt one vehicle asset or one vehicle value for 
applicants who utilize this asset for transportation to doctor appointments, shopping, and 
personal use. Meanwhile pleasure assets such as boats and luxury vehicles, especially for those 
who own more than one vehicle are nonexempt.  
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Figure 3 Proposed Eligibility Determination Using Various Asset Categories 
 Figure 3 shows the identification of all subassets identified, which are then placed into 
two categories—tangible assets (TAC) and real cash (RCC). Each is assigned a weighted score 
that will be combined for a total weighted score result (Wscore). This total score is compared to 
a threshold to determine eligibility or noneligibility. Classifying the subcategories into two 
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groups (TAC or RCC) allows the use of scoring, weights and the threshold approach in the 
algorithm.  
 TAC comprises 10 types of assets in the subasset category whereas RCC comprises five 
types of assets in the subasset category. Dividing 10 by 5 parameters results in a 2-TAC 
parameter table. The first parameter has a score of 2, and each subsequent parameter increases by 
2. For RCC, dividing 5 by 5 parameters results in 1 RCC parameter. The first parameter has a 
score of 1, and each subsequent parameter increases by 1. Tangible assets are considered assets 
that are physical and can be converted into cash within a year whereas real cash includes types of 
assets that present cash in real time. For example, real cash includes the following:  
1. checking accounts 
2. saving accounts 
3. cash in hand  
4. IRA accounts  
5. other cash sources such as 401ks, saving bonds, and home equity 
 Tangible assets include the following:  
1. stocks  
2. bonds 
3. treasury bills 
4. investment property 
5. vacation homes 
6. livestock 
7. collectables such as precious metals and coins 
8. homes 
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9. fixed such as vehicles, boats, aircraft, and watercraft  
10. IRAs 
Each state government can organize and adjust these assets as required by state 
regulations. All asset types are introduced in the subasset categories, and state governments 
determine how each type will be classified—either as tangible, real cash, or a third classification 
if needed. The parameter score is calculated based on how many subassets are included in each 
category, and the number of parameters required. Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the score for each 
parameter within the two main categories.   
Table 2  
Real Cash Parameters 
Range  Range Value Score 
A $0 - $499 1 
B $500 - $999 2 
C $1,000 - $1,499 3 
D $1,500 - $1,999 4 
E >= $2,000 5 
 
Table 3  
Tangible Asset Parameters 
Range Range Value Score 
A $0 - $149,999 2 
B $150,000 - $299,000 4 
C $300,000 - $449,999 6 
D $450,000 - $599,999 8 
E >= $600,000 10 
 
3.3.3.1 Algorithm to calculate weighted score. Classifying assets into two categories 
(TAC or RCC) yields a weight of 0.40 for TAC and a weight of 0.60 RCC based on the 
subcategories included. In real implementation, cost of living and state policies determine the 
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appropriate category weight and range parameters for TAC and RCC scores. Figure 4 represents 
the integrated algorithm.  
 
Figure 4 Algorithm 1 
Input: Asti, Astc , TACw, RCCw, ETH  
(Asti = Individual Asset, Astc = Asset Category, Tacw = Tangible Asset Weight, 
RCCw = Real Cash Weight, ETH = Eligibility Threshold) 
Output: TA, RC  
FOR each asset Asti to be categorized to category parameter    
IF (Asti= Equity), or (Asti = FixedAssets), or (Asti = Collectable), or (Asti = Others)   
    THEN  
      If Asti is of type “Tangible”  
       TAC = TAC +Asti 
   ELSE   
            RCC = RCC + Asti    
 END IF    
END FOR   
       TA = TAC * TACw  
       RC = RCC * RCCw  
   THEN 
TWS = TA +RC 
   Eligible = TWS <= ETH 
  Noneligible = TWS > ETH 
END 
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The algorithm presented in Figure 4 shows the proposed data-driven approach with 
accurate means to classify resources into the appropriate categories using Equation 1.   
 (1) 
Because states differ in terms of their cost of living and policy statues, Algorithm 1 and 
Equation 1 can be customized to state requirements. For example, a state may elect to factor 
other weight measures into the resource categories—for instance, by weighting the current gross 
domestic product for a specific resource acquired by applicants. This allows scalability for future 
outcomes. 
3.3.3.2 Total weighted score. The five categories (entities, fixed assets, collectibles, cash 
sources, and others) provide parameters for the algorithm based on classification and level of 
importance. The total weighted score produces two weights from five parameters. 
• N = {1,…., n}, the number of criteria. 
• i = {1,…., i}, the number of values to be assigned 
• P = parameter value for ith value  
• W = assigned weight for ith value 
The total weighted score is given by Equation 2: 
(2) 
The methodology section described the proposed architecture including algorithms, 
calculations, and the process for detecting and eliminating Medicaid eligibility fraud. The 
following chapter describes the implementation of a prototype for such a system, which can be 
adopted by any U.S. state.     
 


 
P1 * W1 + P2 * W2 
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CHAPTER 4 
Proposed Data-Driven Implementation 
4.1 Layered Architecture  
Many states utilize a mainframe for their board of education, health care services, or IT 
departments. For example, the State of North Carolina utilizes a mainframe for its Department of 
Transportation and Department of Health and Human Services. However, the evolution of IT to 
support business needs and/or detect fraud sometimes creates a heterogeneous environment 
across heterogeneous platforms, which creates a challenging environment for detecting fraud.  
The objective is to support mainframe and distributed environments while integrating 
various platform products to better test the algorithm for effective results. The prototype was 
designed based on a three-layered architecture. Layered architecture provides many advantages 
such as flexibility, maintainability, and scalability. Also, by separation of the user interface, 
business logic, and data access layer, integration concerns can be addressed regarding logical 
layers and components across federal and state departments. The motivation behind data-driven 
implementation is to incorporate modern IT into Medicaid business processes. Information 
associated with each Medicaid applicant should be properly analyzed, queried, stored, and 
accessed. The ability to retrieve public information is essential to addressing the issue of health 
care fraud.  
The prototype consolidates automated electronic data management of Medicaid 
applications and sets robust fraud detection workflow processes into one integrated, data-driven 
infrastructure.  The architecture is developed for any state Medicaid department. The 
implementation is based on three-tier architecture with a web-based Medicaid application 
platform, which allows for a clear separation between applicants, verification workflow 
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processes, and data storage. Furthermore, this infrastructure provides state governments the 
ability to add or replace layers to interoperate different Medicaid services in their health care 
departments. 
 
Figure 5 Data-Driven Layer Architecture 
Figure 5 provides a logical view of the data-driven layer architecture proposed for 
implementation. The details of the architecture are divided into the following subsections:  
1. Presentation layer—the visible part through which users interact with the system. 
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2. Application logic layer—the set of robust fraud detection processes.  
3. Data source layer—the data association and involvement with the entire infrastructure. 
4.1.1 Presentation layer. The presentation layer, also called the graphical user interface 
(GUI) layer, is the visible section of the architecture. Users interact with the system using this 
layer through hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). Typical users are Medicaid applicants who are 
pursuing Medicaid services, Medicaid representatives who assist in application processing and 
helping Medicaid applicants who are computer literate or lack access to the HTTP client, and 
Medicaid Administrators who manage the overall application process.  
 The presentation layer contains applicants’ and health care administrators’ GUIs and 
user forms for the data feed. These forms include the following: (a) sign up, (b) sign in, (c) 
welcome, and (d) Medicaid application. Applicants see the sign-up form before they can sign in 
to access the Medicaid application web form. Figure 6 illustrates a sample sign-up form. It 
includes basic information for associating an applicant with his or her account.   
 
Figure 6 Sign-up Form 
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By contrast, representatives and administrators log in using predefined credentials to 
access new and existing Medicaid applications. Figure 7 illustrates the sign-in requirement for 
accessing Medicaid accounts.  
 
Figure 7 Sign-In Form 
Applicants will also utilize this form to access their account. Unlike Medicaid 
administrators, applicants can only view their own account. Medicaid administrators can view all 
accounts under review.  
 The presentation layer includes web browser processes for displaying HTML requests 
and processing HTML responses. Users can access the site through a variety of web browsers, 
such as Firefox, Internet Explorer, or Safari. The web browser communicates with a web server 
using a standard protocol for properly displaying HTML pages on the user HTTP client without 
the need for prior configuration.  
After sign in, the web server transfers and displays the appropriate screen based on the 
user’s sign-in credentials.  For applicants, the welcome screen illustrated in Figure 8 displays 
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three menus for the user: account profile, new application, and check application status. This 
feature will allow Medicaid applicants to electronically submit their Medicaid application, 
review application status, and access any messages or notifications about issues with their 
application via their account profile.  
 
Figure 8 Welcome Screen User Interface 
Once the user chooses to the new application menu, the Medicaid application user form is 
displayed to the user. Figure 9 represents the data-driven Medicaid application web form. It 
consists of required input fields. The web form is a sample form based on the North Carolina 
Medicaid application (North Carolina Department of Health Human Services, n.d.-a).  
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Figure 9 Data-Driven Medicaid Application Web Form 
Many of the input fields are streamlined for accurately collecting appropriate data 
pertaining to the input field. Applicants’ home address, city, state, and zip code are verified 
instantly through the SmartyStreets application program interface (API) for precise information 
(SmartyStreets, n.d.). The county input field is accordingly populated with the counties of that 
state. The rest of the input fields are also simplified for data consistency across all applicants.   
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The main purpose of this layer is twofold: (a) to electronically collect user information, 
pass it to the application layer for processing, and then reveal a response output such as the 
application result, whether the applicant is being monitored, and the application status, and to (b) 
collect precise and consistent data from applicants for future analysis. 
4.1.2 Application layer. The application layer is the key structure in enterprise 
architecture. It acts as the principle for organizing logic flow between business processes and IT 
data infrastructure, reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the system 
model. It is responsible for retrieving, processing, and transforming data. The application layer in 
this data-driven design consists of an eligibility flow process as the application logic workflow. 
The application layer manages four processes, the object component for each of the four 
processes to carry out its instructions, and the object entity components for allocation and 
distribution of data.  As for the application logic workflow, it is responsible for systematically 
executing a sequence of processes to attain a business process. Once the data are collected from 
the presentation layer and passed to this layer, the eligibility flow process initiates (a) a legal 
citizenship match, (b) an income match, (c) asset determination, and (d) the eligibility score 
process.  
The eligibility flow process is concerned with fulfilling each business process in order to 
ensure that business rules and Medicaid application fraud detection are successful. It is also 
responsible for processing interruptions in the event of data verification failures or fraud 
detection. A review of the federal eligibility requirements (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, n.d.) is performed in the first two processes. Asset determination and eligibility 
verification are performed in the last two processes. This allows the eligibility flow process to 
interrupt the workflow in the event of fraud detection in an applicant’s social security number or 
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legal citizenship claim to skip the asset determination step to the eligibility score process. Each 
process in the eligibility workflow calls out a specific object component for that particular 
process. Object components are the engines behind the process. They include instructions 
according to business rules for processing. Furthermore, each object component is further 
divided into an object entity component. Object entity components will capture the necessary 
data according to the object component. They also store data to the Medicaid database (Medicaid 
DB Storage) and ensure data consistency according to Medicaid business rules.  
Accordingly, after the data are passed to the application layer, the eligibility flow process 
will initiate a citizenship match process. This is a combination of a social security number match 
and legal status match. This process will call out the social security number match process 
component for execution and processing of social security number match instructions. The object 
entity component within the social security number match process component will evaluate and 
transform data to store it in Medicaid DB Storage.  
Upon successful completion of the social security number match process, the legal status 
process matches for citizenship. Then, the eligibility workflow moves to the next process: the 
income match process. The income object entity component retrieves applicants’ income and 
identifies whether it is below the poverty line or not. If the applicant does not satisfy the income 
and citizenship requirements, the process stops and jumps to the eligibility score process. Figure 
3 represents a logical view flow chart of the eligibility flow process, which illustrates the entire 
process flow from the start of the Medicaid application to the decision output.  
Subsequently, the eligibility workflow transfers the process to the asset determination 
process then the eligibility score process. Then the eligibility algorithm, including total weighted 
score and weight score calculation, is implemented in the asset determination process. Then we 
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incorporate the eligibility determination score in the object entity component of the eligibility 
score process.  
4.1.3 Data source layer. This layer provides access to different database types. There are 
two general database structural models in the health care industry that are used during the 
application process: hierarchical and relational. The hierarchical database is used in the 
mainframe’s management information system and stores data in inverted format. The structure in 
the Relational Database Management System (RDMS) stores data, such as binary large objects, 
XML, and other object-oriented data in rows and tables. A relational database structure was used 
for implementation testing on Medicaid’s internal database and external resource databases.  
The internal data source was used to connect to the internal database (Medicaid DB 
Storage), which is used for storing data from Medicaid applications and application layer 
processes. These also use an internal database for data retrieval during application layer process 
implementation. The internal database comprises applicant and spouse information and applicant 
match schema. Each table schema is discussed in the next section. The external part of the data 
source represents databases located in different physical tiers for retrieving matching information 
regarding the applicant. It encompasses the following external databases:  
• Bendex: The Bendex database is an SSA database for exchanging social security numbers 
with states agencies on a daily basis through Bendex Connection (Social Security 
Administration, n.d.). 
• State Verification Exchange System (SVES): This is another SSA database that includes 
SVES I, SVES I/Citizenship, SVES II, SVES II, and SVES IV for federal agencies to 
extract citizenship data of an individual for citizenship verification via SVES service 
connection (Social Security Administration, n.d.).   
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• DMV: This database corresponds to a local state DMV database. It is used for extracting 
owners’ vehicle information, such as how many vehicle assets the owner owns and the 
asset’s market value. Connection to this database is via a direct link (North Carolina 
Department of Transportation, n.d.).  
• Private Asset: A database by KnowX (http://knowx.com) for retrieving aircraft assets, 
real estate, U.S. Coast Guard vessels, watercraft, and other assets. Connection to this 
database and data format is uniquely personalized to the type of service required by the 
user (KnowX, n.d.; LexisNexis, n.d.). 
• Governmental Liaison Data Exchange Program (GLDEP): This database is used for data 
sharing between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and state tax agencies. It includes 
taxpayer income information. Connection to this database is via a GLDEP service link 
(IRS, n.d.). 
• SmartyStreets: This database provides fast and easy U.S address verification. It validates 
applicants’ addresses by verifying them in real time with the SmartyStreets API. If the 
address is ambiguous, SmartyStreets displays multiple matches. This allows the applicant 
to be alerted via HTML when the address is invalid. Once the data are verified or 
corrected, the JSON file provided by SmartyStreets is extracted and the user address 
information is updated with the correct syntax. This will provide address consistency in 
Medicaid DB Storage (SmartyStreets, n.d.).  
Bendex is used for matching applicants’ social security numbers. Then SVES is used to 
retrieve applicants’ citizenship status. Next, the GLDEP, Private Asset, and DMV databases are 
used to orderly retrieve applicants’ income and assets. The DMV database is used as a secondary 
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asset verification database. Medicaid DB Storage is used upon retrieval of data from the 
mentioned databases for data storage and application layer processing.  
Because Medicaid data or other health care data sets could not be used for this study due 
to privacy concerns, a sample of synthetic data was created to represent a live database system. 
This prototype was used to conduct testing and validate the data-driven implementation. The 
following database tables are described in detail.   
• Applicant: This table included a sample of required information about each applicant 
applying for Medicaid benefits and services. It included personal information about the 
individual, such as first name, middle name, maiden name, social security number, sex 
(male or female), date of birth, race (Asian, Black or African American, White or 
Caucasian, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Hispanic Cuban, or 
Other Pacific Islander), legal status (citizen, noncitizen, or permanent resident), alien 
registration number, and marital status (single, married, divorced, or widowed).  
• Spouse info: This table included a sample of the necessary information about the 
applicant’s spouse. It was linked with the applicant schema via ID number. Figure 5 
displays spouse’s social security number, spouse’s first name, spouse’s middle name, and 
spouse’s last name. However, the prototype included more attributes of spousal 
information, similar to the attributes included in the applicant schema.   
• Applicant match: This table consisted of attributes required by the application layer for 
processing applications. It included social security number (yes or no) to denote a social 
security number match or nonmatch, citizenship (yes or no) to signify a match or 
nonmatch, income (yes or no) to denote an income match or nonmatch result, a Weighted 
Real Cash Category (WRCC)  value between 1.2 and 6 that corresponded to the WRCC 
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output in the category weighted assets calculation, a WTAC value between 1.6 and 4.8 
that corresponded to the Weighted Tangible Asset Category (WTAC) output in the 
category weighted assets calculation, a Total Weighted Score (TWS) value between 2.8 
and 14 to denote the total weighted score calculation result, and eligibility (eligible or 
noneligible) from the eligibility score process. This table was also linked to the applicant 
schema via application ID. An unperformed process was denoted as “--”.     
• Social security: This schema table represented the social security schema in Bendex. It 
contained social security numbers that had been assigned to an individual. Figure 5 
displays a sample of these numbers from the prototype.  
• SSA citizenship: This table represented the citizenship schema in the SSA database. It 
provided the legal status of social security number holders. It also contained the 
individual’s first name, middle name, last name, date of birth, and legal status date to 
denote the date green card holders became permanent residents.  
• Income: This schema contained taxpayers’ income information. For simplicity, the 
following fields were included: gross income, income type (1040, 1040EZ, 1040A), and 
year.  This schema represented the income schema in the state’s IRS federal department.  
• Real cash asset: This table represented the data extraction from KnowX, which lists 
individuals’ real cash source (checking or savings). The cash-on-hand column was 
supplemented to include applicants’ cash-on-hand disclosure from the web application. 
These records were stored in U.S dollars.  
• Tangible assets: This table represents the data extracted from KnowX, which lists 
individuals’ tangible asset resources. It included Asset 1 (cars and their market value), 
Asset 2 (boats and their market value), Asset 3 (houses and their market value), and Asset 
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4 (watercraft and their market value). The prototype included more assets and asset types 
than what is presented in Figure 6. The assets’ market value was stored in U.S dollars.  
The tables were used to identify the type of information necessary for fraud detection in 
Medicaid applications. However, the schema attributes are just a sample that we conclude in the 
prototype. Real implementation would include much more information to accurately complete all 
required information pertaining to the system. In the following section, the type of association 
and integration between these tables is described.   
4.2 Integration & Consolidation 
The Medicaid Eligibility Application System (MEAS) prototype interoperates with a set 
of integrated databases and acts as the data store for the prototype subprocesses and application 
functions.  The following figure illustrates the logical integration of data source tables.  
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Figure 10 Data-Driven ERD 
Figure 10 is an illustration of entity relation diagram (ERD) on data integration between 
tables. This integration allows data access and data sharing between subprocess applications 
without the need for an extra layer of integration services. Furthermore, this allows for consistent 
information that is frequently updated to be readily synchronized for the subprocesses. The 
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motivation behind data integration was to combine the data located in external sources to present 
a unified view of these data for the user (Lenzerini, 2002). This development is significantly 
important when companies merge their databases or when systems combine data results from 
different internal sources.  
  The data-driven ERD represents a sample of data integration. A real system may include 
more tables to completely streamline and synchronize data for applications within the 
infrastructure. Data consolidation may occur in one or more tables depending on the 
requirement. For instance, data can be consolidated according to application information in the 
applicant’s application table or according to a number of subprocesses. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Validation 
5.1 Data Set 
The experimental results were based on inspecting the application layer process for each 
applicant’s Medicaid application, starting with a social security number match and ending with 
an eligible or noneligible application result. Data populated in the prototype database tables 
included thousands of synthetic data records.  
 5.1.1 Synthetic data generator. Data populated in MEAS were created via two 
applications—Spawner and Generatedata.com—to test the proposed fraud detection 
mechanisms. Spawner is a win32 application available online (Spawner Data Generator, n.d.). 
The application allows researchers, or anyone for that matter, to generate a random of sample of 
test data for any type of database through delimited text or SQL insert statements output. It can 
also output data directly into a MySQL 5.x database. Figure 11 displays a screenshot of fields to 
be populated or generated with random data based on the assigned parameters required. Spawner 
is capable of generating as many records as needed. Its capabilities were examined, and its value 
and performance were noted as it generated over 10,000 social security records.  
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Figure 11 Spawner Data Set Generator 
Generatedata.com is another sample/test data generator. It is available via a web form or 
in a GNU-licensed version that requires a server setup. Nevertheless, it is a free, open-source tool 
that allows users to generate large volumes of random data in a variety of formats for such 
purposes as testing software, populating tables in a database, or creating custom data. 
Alternatively, if you want to avoid setting it up on your own server, you can donate $20 or more 
to gain a premium account on this site, permitting you to generate up to 5,000 records at a time 
(instead of the maximum 100), and allows you to save your data sets (Generatedata.com, n.d.). 
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Figure 12 is a screenshot of the spouse info parameter structure before random data were 
generated for the table.  
 
Figure 12 Generatedata.com Data Set Generator 
5.2 Synthetic Data Record Validation  
This section contains a sample of the data records generated from the aforementioned 
applications and the experimental results. Each of the following sample applicants was indicated 
as eligible or noneligible through the data-driven prototype to filter fraudulent Medicaid 
applications. The operation was followed accordingly to the eligibility flow model described in 
section 3.3.2.  
• Applicant 101: Demetria Giselle Clay is represented in Table 4, which displays all of the 
personal information she has filed in her Medicaid application.   
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Table 4  
Applicant Database Table 
ID First Name 
Middle 
Name Maiden Last SSN Sex D.O.B Race 
Legal 
Status 
Alien R. 
Number 
Marital 
Status 
101 Demetria Giselle Shelton Clay 404-15-8841 F 
1990/0
1/27 B Citizen - Married 
102 Halee Martena Boyd Sharpe 533-12-7787 F 
2001/0
4/28 W 
Non-
Citizen - Married 
103 Natalie Jonah Fox Saunders 589-75-2785 F 
1978/1
1/08 C Citizen - Single 
104 Risa Chelsea Ramos Clevelan 646-69-2753 F 
1957/1
2/10 C 
P. 
Resident 
493-116-
189 Married 
105 Conan Doris  Greene 653-77-6364 M 
1987/0
7/12 W 
P. 
Resident 
376-431-
477 Single 
106 Barrett Caldwell  Vargas 662-13-0314 M 
1979/0
8/28 B 
Non-
Citizen - Married 
107 Ivory Mannix  Cox 730-56-2993 M 
1978/1
0/02 B Citizen - Divorced 
108 Linda Ferris Pitts Herman 742-34-1690 F 
1984/1
1/09 I Citizen - Married 
109 Francesca Walker  Prince 761-75-3769 M 
1982/1
0/21 C Citizen - Widowed 
110 Giselle Imelda Erickson Shelton 790-09-4575 F 
1979/0
1/21 P Citizen - Married 
 
Table 5 displays the spouse information Demetria filed with her application. The spouse 
information record is linked to her application ID.   
Table 5  
Spouse Information Database Table 
ID Spouse SSN First Name M. Name L. Name 
101 021-99-1278 Myra Tyson Leilani 
102 035-39-3347 Keay Anne Donaldson 
103 032-91-5618 Audra Whitney Sanders 
104 041-45-0075 Kathleen Heidi Shepherd 
105 050-85-2465 Walker Edan Allison 
106 070-58-5368 Lara Moran Chang 
107 084-56-8703 Lani Sparks Rios 
108 096-71-6432 Jayme Turner Weber 
109 087-47-6591 Hector Ira Cabrera 
110 062-28-6813 Imelda Rios Vaughn 
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Demetria’s social security number, 404-15-8841, exists in the social security table. Table 
6 displays a sample of the social security numbers used to check if the applicant had a 
valid social security number in the system.  
Table 6  
Social Security Database Table 
SSN 
404-15-8841 
533-12-7787 
589-75-2785 
646-69-2753 
653-77-6364 
352-12-0846 
184-81-3315 
742-34-1690 
761-75-3769 
790-09-4575 
 
Therefore, the designation “yes” for her social security number assigned to her an 
applicant match table record. 
Her social security number matched her name and citizenship legal status in the SSA 
citizenship table, which is represented in Table 7. Therefore, the designation “yes” for 
citizenship assigned to her an applicant match table record. 
Table 7  
SSA Citizenship Database Table 
SSN First Name 
Middle 
Name Maiden Last D.O.B 
Legal 
Status 
L.S 
Date 
404-15-8841 Demetria Giselle Shelton Clay 2003/12/23 Citizen - 
533-12-7787 Halee Martena Boyd Sharpe 2003/12/23 Non-Citizen - 
589-75-2785 Natalie Jonah Fox Saunders 2003/12/23 Citizen - 
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Table 7 
Cont.        
646-69-2753 Risa Chelsea Ramos Clevelan 2003/12/23 P. Resident 
2003/1
2/23 
653-77-6364 Conan Doris  Greene 2003/12/23 P. Resident 
2010/1
2/23 
662-13-0314 Barrett Caldwell  Vargas 2003/12/23 Non-Citizen - 
730-56-2993 Ivory Mannix  Cox 2003/12/23 Non-Citizen - 
742-34-1690 Linda Ferris Pitts Herman 2003/12/23 Citizen - 
761-75-3769 Francesca Walker  Prince 2003/12/23 Citizen - 
790-09-4575 Giselle Imelda Erickson Shelton 2003/12/23 Non-Citizen - 
 
Demetria’s gross income, retrieved from income table as illustrated in Table 8, was 
$9,000.  
Table 8  
Income Database Table 
SSN Gross Income Income Type Year 
404-15-8841 $ 9, 000.00 1040 EZ 2013 
589-75-2785 $11, 000.00 1040 2013 
646-69-2753 $10,000.00 1040 EZ 2013 
742-34-1690 $11,000.00 1040 A 2013 
761-75-3769 $10, 000.00 1040 2013 
 
This falls below the poverty line. Therefore, an income “yes” match was assigned to her 
an applicant match record. Demetria’s real cash assets were retrieved from the real cash 
table using her social security number as represented in Table 9. Her assets were $175 
($25 + $100 + $50).  
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Table 9  
Real Cash Database Table 
SSN Checking Saving Cash on Hand 
404-15-8841 $ 25.00 $ 100.00 $ 50.00 
589-75-2785 $ 500.00 $ 950.00 $ 0.00 
646-69-2753 $ 5000.00 $ 30,0000.00 $ 100.00 
742-34-1690 $ 1000.00 $ 2,500.00 $ 200.00 
761-75-3769 $ 150.00 $ 75.00 $ 85.00 
 
This corresponded to a score of 1, as represented in Real Cash Parameters Table (Pg. 31). 
Therefore, her assigned WRCC value in her applicant match record was 0.60 (1 x 0.60).  
An income and RCC “yes” match assigned to her an applicant match record since $9,175 
($175.00 +$9,000) is still below the required poverty line. Demetria’s tangible assets, 
retrieved from the tangible asset resources table in Table 10 equaled $453,000 ($8,000 + 
$8,000 + $435,000 + $2,000).  
Table 10  
Tangible Asset Database Table 
SSN Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3 Asset 4 
404-15-8841 Vehicle,  $ 8000.00 Boat,  $ 8000.00 House, $ 435K Water Craft, $ 2K 
589-75-2785 Vehicle,  $ 0.00 Boat,  $ 0.00 House, $ 0.00 Water Craft, $ 0.00 
646-69-2753 Vehicle,  $ 500.00 Boat,  $ 0.00 House, $ 0.00 Water Craft, $ 1K 
742-34-1690 Vehicle,  $ 1000.00 Boat,  $ 0.00 House, $ 0.00 Water Craft, $ 0.00 
761-75-3769 Vehicle,  $ 1000.00 Boat,  $ 0.00 House, $ 125K Water Craft, $ 0.00 
 
Her tangible assets corresponded to a score of 8, as represented in Tangible Asset 
Parameters Table. Therefore, her assigned WTAC value in her applicant match record 
was 3.2 (8 x 0.40) as represented in Table 11. 
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Table 11  
Applicant Match Database Table 
ID SSN Citizenship Income WRCC Income & WRCC WTAC TWS Eligibility 
101 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3.2 3.8 Non- Eligible 
102 Yes No - - - - - Non- Eligible 
103 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 0.8 2.6 Non- Eligible 
104 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 0.8 3.8 Non- Eligible 
105 Yes No - - - - - Non- Eligible 
106 No No - - - - - Non- Eligible 
107 No No - - - - - Non- Eligible 
108 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 0.8 3.8 Non- Eligible 
109 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.8 1.4 Eligible 
110 Yes No - - - - - Non- Eligible 
 
Demetria’s total weighted score was equal to 3.8 (0.60 + 3.2). Because her total weighted 
score was greater than the threshold, she was identified as noneligible.   
• Applicant 102: Halee Martena Sharpe’s social security number existed in the social 
security table. Therefore, a social security number “yes” match was assigned to her 
applicant match schema record. Her social security number matched noncitizen legal 
status. Therefore, a citizenship “no” match was assigned to her applicant match schema 
record, and the process skipped to eligibility. Halee's eligibility was identified as 
noneligible because she did not have a match for citizenship. 
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• Applicant 103: Natalie Jonah Saunders’s social security number existed; therefore a 
social security number “yes” match was assigned. Her social security number matched 
her name and citizenship legal status; therefore a citizenship “yes” match was assigned. 
Her gross income was retrieved from the income table and was below the poverty line. 
Therefore, an income “yes” match was assigned. Her real cash assets were retrieved from 
the real cash table, and the corresponding score equaled 1.8. An income and RCC “no” 
match was assigned to her applicant match record since her income and real cash assets 
were greater than the poverty line. Her tangible assets retrieved from the tangible asset 
resources table and the corresponding score equaled 0.80. Natalie’s total weighted score 
was equal to 2.6. Although Natalie’s total weighted score was below the eligibility 
threshold, her eligibility was identified as noneligible as her Income and RCC was a “no” 
match. 
• Applicant 104: This applicant was similar to Applicant 103. There was a match on social 
security number, citizenship (more than 5 years of permanent residency), and income. 
The difference was that Risa Chelsea Clevelan had a TWS above the threshold, which did 
not affect the application as she was already noneligible due to a “no” match on income 
and RCC.  
• Applicant 105: Conan Doris Greene had a social security number match, but no 
citizenship match because his legal residency was not at least 5 years. Therefore, he was 
identified as noneligible.  
• Applicants 106 and 107: Barrett and Ivory did not have a match on social security 
number and citizenship. Therefore, they were identified as noneligible applicants.  
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• Applicant 108: This applicant was similar to Applicant 104. There was a match on social 
security number, citizenship, and income. But there was a “no” match on income and 
RCC. Therefore, Linda Ferris Pitts was identified as noneligible.   
• Applicant 109: Francesca Walker Prince’s social security number had a match. She also 
had a citizenship match, and her gross income and income and RCC were below the 
poverty line. Her total weighted score was equal to 1.4, which was below the eligibility 
threshold. Therefore, her eligibility was identified as eligible.  
• Applicant 110: Giselle Imelda Shelton’s social security number exists in Social Security 
Table. However, her citizenship returned a noncitizenship legal status. Consequently, a 
citizenship “no” match assigned to her an applicant match table record. Therefore, her 
eligibility was identified as noneligible as she has no match for citizenship. 
Based on the experimental results of these applicants, it was concluded that for an 
application to be nonfraudulent, it must satisfy the following requirements: (a) the applicant’s 
social security number exists in the social security table, (b) the applicant’s citizenship is labeled 
as “citizen” or “permanent resident” with 5 years residency, (c) the applicant’s income is below 
required poverty line, (d) the applicant’s income and RCC are not greater than the required 
poverty line, and (e) the applicant’s total weighted score is equal to less than the eligibility 
threshold. Otherwise, the Medicaid application is labeled as fraudulent. 
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Chapter 6 
Data Analysis and Findings 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the data that were created using a synthetic generator approach and 
processed in relation to fraud-detection objectives. The fundamental goals that motivated the 
data analysis were to develop a knowledge base of Medicaid benefits savings when filtering 
fraud and to determine the validity of the proposed data-driven approach compared to the current 
approach used for determining fraudulent Medicaid application.      
6.2 Description of the Data 
The data processed for analysis were based on data results similar to the applicant match 
table, as presented in Figure 20. All match fields are marked with a “yes,” and all nonmatched 
fields are marked with “no,” including the WTAC and TWS columns. The exception is the last 
column, eligibility, which is marked with either “eligible” or “noneligible” values.   
6.3 All Possible Scenarios 
This section presents all the possible scenarios or combinations of the processed data. 
There were two different outputs (yes and no) and seven different categories (social security 
number, citizenship, income, WRCC, income and WRCC, WTAC, and TWS). The different 
possibilities were calculated using the data-driven combination formula in Equation 3.  
  (3) 
Equation 3 yields (27) a total of 128 possible scenarios that may occur during the 
processing of generating data. These possible scenarios are presented in the Appendix.  
All Possible Scenarios = {(Output) Categories} 
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6.5 Analysis Method 
This section describes the analysis method used to analyze the data collected. IBM 
predictive analytics software (SPSS) was used. SPSS is a Windows program used to perform 
data entry and analysis on large amounts of data. Field (2013) was consulted to learn about the 
SPSS environment and how to utilize the software to meet the objectives of the study. As a 
result, descriptive statistics using frequency distribution were considered in order to better 
understand the data. The following section presents the frequency distribution findings for the 
data.  
6.6 Findings 
All 1,010 applicants were processed by means of a current approach and the proposed 
data-driven approach. Table 12 presents the frequencies that resulted when the data were 
processed under the current approach. Table 13 presents the frequencies that resulted when the 
data were processed against the proposed data-driven approach.  
Table 12  
Eligibility Under Current Medicaid Approach 
Criteria Frequency Percent 
Noneligible Applicants 3620 36.2 
Eligible Applicants 6390 63.8 
Total 10010 100.0 
 
Table 12 indicates that 6,390 applications were marked eligible against Medicaid’s 
current approach whereas only 3,620 were marked noneligible. Figure 13 displays a graphical 
pie chart of the frequency distribution output and shows that the percentage of eligible and 
noneligible applicants was 36% and 64%, respectively. 
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Figure 13 Eligibility Under the current Medicaid approach  
Table 5 indicates that 5,776 applications were marked eligible using the data-driven 
approach whereas only 4,232 were marked noneligible. Figure 14 displays a graphical pie chart 
of the frequency distribution output and shows that the percentage of eligible and noneligible 
applicants was 42% and 58%, respectively.  
Table 13  
Eligibility Under The Data-Driven Approach 
Criteria Frequency Percent 
Non-Eligible Applicants 4234 42.3 
Eligible Applicants 5776 57.7 
Total 10010 100.0 
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Figure 14 Eligibility Under The Data Driven Approach  
Thus, 36.2% of applicants were noneligible based on the current approach compared to 
42.3% based on the data-driven approach. This indicates that using the data-driven approach can 
eliminate more fraudulent Medicaid applications than the current approach used by the Medicaid 
health services departments. As a result, the frequency descriptive statistics showed that 614 
(6,390 – 5,776) more applicants were eligible under the current approach compared to the 
proposed data-driven approach. Consequently, State’s Medicaid services would save $4,250,722 
by using the proposed data-driven approach according to Medicaid’s average spending ($6,923) 
per beneficiary (Cassidy, n.d.). 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion  
This thesis discussed fraud-detection ideas within the health care system and alternative 
approaches for detecting fraud before it occurs. It also provided examples of fraud in the health 
care system by individuals, facilities, and fraudulent organized entities. It is vital to keep this 
topic open for continuous study and improvement in order to best utilize federal health care 
expenditures with minimal or no fraudulent activities allowed.  
This thesis also presented related work in many different aspects with regards to health 
care data mining and fraud-detection tools and techniques. A data-driven implementation that 
couples a comprehensive, standards-based Medicaid eligibility guideline was proposed with a 
robust set of fraud-detection workflow processes to filter fraudulent Medicaid applications. 
Identifying fraud at an early stage reduces the number of abusers of the health care system and 
allows for future monitoring for similar activities.  
The integrated algorithm of weights and scores of asset categories allowed the 
determination of applicant eligibility based on assets available without undermining each asset 
value. Furthermore, the synthetic testing data created with the data generator software and 
processed through IBM SPSS descriptive statistics analysis were examined. As a result, it was 
determined that state’s Medicaid services could use the proposed data-driven system to filter 
fraudulent Medicaid application and save significant amount of Medicaid expenditures. 
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  Appendix 
Table  
List of possible scenarios for data-driven processing 
 
SSN Citizen Income WRC WRC & Income WTAC TWS Eligibility 
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
5 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
6 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
8 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
9 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
10 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
11 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
12 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
13 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
14 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No 
15 Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
16 Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
17 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
18 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
19 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
20 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
21 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
22 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
23 Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
24 Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
25 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
26 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
27 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
28 Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 
29 Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
30 Yes Yes No No No Yes No No 
31 Yes Yes No No No No Yes No 
32 Yes Yes No No No No No No 
33 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
34 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
35 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
36 Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
37 Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
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Table (Cont.) 
List of possible scenarios for data-driven processing 
 
SSN Citizen Income WRC WRC & Income WTAC TWS Eligibility 
38 Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No 
39 Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
40 Yes No Yes Yes No No No No 
41 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
42 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
43 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
44 Yes No Yes No Yes No No No 
45 Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
46 Yes No Yes No No Yes No No 
47 Yes No Yes No No No Yes No 
48 Yes No Yes No No No No No 
49 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
50 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
51 Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
52 Yes No No Yes Yes No No No 
53 Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No 
54 Yes No No Yes No Yes No No 
55 Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
56 Yes No No Yes No No No No 
57 Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
58 Yes No No No Yes Yes No No 
59 Yes No No No Yes No Yes No 
60 Yes No No No Yes No No No 
61 Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
62 Yes No No No No Yes No No 
63 Yes No No No No No Yes No 
64 Yes No No No No No No No 
65 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
66 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
67 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
68 No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
69 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
70 No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
71 No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
72 No Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
73 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
74 No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
75 No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
76 No Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
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Table (Cont.) 
List of possible scenarios for data-driven processing 
 
SSN Citizen Income WRC WRC & Income WTAC TWS Eligibility 
77 No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
78 No Yes Yes No No Yes No No 
79 No Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
80 No Yes Yes No No No No No 
81 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
82 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
83 No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
84 No Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
85 No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
86 No Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
87 No Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
88 No Yes No Yes No No No No 
89 No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
90 No Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
91 No Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
92 No Yes No No Yes No No No 
93 No Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
94 No Yes No No No Yes No No 
95 No Yes No No No No Yes No 
96 No Yes No No No No No No 
97 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
98 No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
99 No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
100 No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
101 No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
102 No No Yes Yes No Yes No No 
103 No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
104 No No Yes Yes No No No No 
105 No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
106 No No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
107 No No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
108 No No Yes No Yes No No No 
109 No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
110 No No Yes No No Yes No No 
111 No No Yes No No No Yes No 
112 No No Yes No No No No No 
113 No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
114 No No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
115 No No No Yes Yes No Yes No 
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Table (Cont.) 
List of possible scenarios for data-driven processing 
 
SSN Citizen Income WRC WRC & Income WTAC TWS Eligibility 
116 No No No Yes Yes No No No 
117 No No No Yes No Yes Yes No 
118 No No No Yes No Yes No No 
119 No No No Yes No No Yes No 
120 No No No Yes No No No No 
121 No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
122 No No No No Yes Yes No No 
123 No No No No Yes No Yes No 
124 No No No No Yes No No No 
125 No No No No No Yes Yes No 
126 No No No No No Yes No No 
127 No No No No No No Yes No 
128 No No No No No No No No 
      
